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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Workers' Compensation (WC) insurance is a form of social welfare required
and regulated by individual states. WC is administered as insurance premiums
attached to payrolls (Weil, 2001). The purpose ofWC insurance is to protect
workers from earnings losses resulting from on-the-job injuries and to stabilize the
cost of payments in order to insulate employers from catastrophic monetary
judgments. WC laws release employers from liability for on-the-job injuries as long
as employers pay for WC insurance and obey state health and safety laws (Durbin &
Kish,1998). Rising costs ofWC have been a concern since the mid 1970's when a
number of reforms were enacted (Durbin & Kish, 1998). Despite considerable policy
attention throughout the 1980's and 1990's costs have continued to grow and
insurers and employers have sought ways to contain costs (Campolieti, 2004;
Dembe, 2001; Durbin & Kish, 1998; Huang, Baldwin, & Conway, December 2006).
One method of cost containment is a Claim Disposition Agreement (CDA), also
known as compromise and release. In exchange for a lump sum payment, the injured
employee waives his/her right to ongoing disability payments. Ostensibly, the goal
of a CDA is to reduce the need for expensive litigation and the administrative costs of
2issuing payments for an indefinite amount of time. However, some researchers
contend that CDAs are used by insurers to pressure vulnerable claimants into
accepting less compensation than they would be entitled to if the claim were fully
adjudicated (Thomason & Burton, 1993).
CDAs are used most often in cases of Permanent Partial Disability (PPD), in
which a worker has an injury that has been determined to be permanently impairing
(but not precluding all work), resulting in continued earnings loss or cases in which
the insurer is very certain of an inevitable determination of PPD. PPD injuries vary
widely and can include, but are not limited to: loss of limb, loss or reduction of sense,
restricted range of motion, or chronic pain. Cases of PPD are among the most
difficult to measure for earnings losses (Durbin & Kish, 1998).
PPD covers a wide range of physical impairment, which mayor may not
impact the ability to return to work and the performance of the worker upon return.
PPD is complicated by the fact that though injuries are considered to be permanent
in nature, they mayor may not permanently impair earnings capacity. Aworker may
incur a PPD injury that prevents return to the duties he/she performed prior to
injury but does not preclude retraining for work of comparable or better pay. A
worker may incur a PPD injury that allows the worker to return to work with
modified duty. Injuries may occur that do not substantially impair work
performance, but do in some way impact physical ability, which may also impact
enjoyment of activities outside of work that the employee participated in prior to
injury. For these reasons, when assessing the damage done by a PPD injury,
3claimants and insurers must consider not only lost wages but future productivity and
personal activities that may be impacted. In most cases where PPD is determined or
presumed, the worker does in fact return to work (usually in the same position) after
a suitable recovery period (Manley, 2010). Permanent total disability, in which the
worker is unable to return to work after recovery, is rare (Manley, 2010). Once a
determination of PPD is made, it is possible to reopen PPD cases for reassessment if
improvement or deterioration are found later on (CBS, 2008).
The above mentioned characteristics make CDAs attractive to insurers who
wish to limit adjudication costs and to claimants with an aversion to bureaucracy.
Given the implicit relationship between PPD and CDAs, how sensitive should
we expect CDAs to be to changes in PPD benefit levels? Much of the literature on WC
focuses on how final disability ratings are arrived at, on the broader impacts of on-
the-job injuries to society, and the rising costs ofWC. There has been very little
empirical examination of CDAs. This study will help to fill this void by analyzing the
relationship between a potential stream ofWC benefits and negotiated CDAs on real
claims processed in the state of Oregon. The question being, is there a quantitatively
measureable relationship between PPD payments and negotiated CDA amounts and
if so, what is the nature of the relationship?
In order to form a coherent framework for thinking about CDAs I rely on
research in the area of decision-making gleaned from economics and psychology.
4Oregon
An opportunity to examine the relationship between PPO payments and COA
amounts arises in Oregon. In 1996 the Oregon legislature raised the benefit cap on
PPO and other WC benefit payments under Senate Bill 369 (hereafter referred to as
SB369). The increase for PPO benefits went into effect midway through the fiscal
year. Changes in other benefits went into effect at the beginning of the fiscal year.
COAs are a substitute for other forms of benefits, primarily PPO. The time lag
between benefit increases offers us the opportunity to isolate and measure the effect
of PPO rates on COA amounts. First, I will examine aggregate claims data for a period
of 16 years before and after SB369. Then, I will compare COA settlement amounts
for claims six months before and after the PPO benefit increase. In order to isolate
the effects ofPPO on COA amounts I will control for demographic factors (age,
gender and education), and job factors (time loss and pre-injury wage).
Oregon is an excellent laboratory for this quasi-experiment due to some of the
unique features ofWC law in the state. The Oregon system ofWC is markedly less
litigious than most other states. The claims process is explained clearly to claimants,
payments are made voluntarily by insurers in a timely fashion (in most cases), and
the state agency that oversees WC in Oregon participates actively in the process to
ensure smooth processing of claims (Boden & Victor, 1994). Furthermore, the State
of Oregon does not allow claimants to release insurers from medical benefit payment
(CBS, 2008; OOCBS, 2006). In this system, it is far less likely that claimants will feel
5pressured to accept CDAs that are unreasonably low or require heuristic calculations
of future medical expenses.
Cognitive Economic Models of Claimant Decision Making in
Individual Present Value Calculations
When negotiating a CDA, the worker must consider the difference between a
potential stream of payments that closely resembles income earned from work and a
lump sum payment that more closely resembles a windfall payment such as an
inheritance, gift or winnings from a game of chance. In standard accounting practice,
the lump sum amount is known as the present value of the payment stream (typically
known as an annuity).
The Standard Formula for Present Value of Stream Payments
The standard formula of the present value of a payment stream is:
PV = [PMT/11 * [1- 1/[1+i]n]
Where:
PV = Present Value of a payment stream
PMT = The amount of each payment
i = the interest rate
n = the number of periods the payment is to be made
In the case of a bond, annuity or other investment vehicle, i is the interest
earned on the principle investment.
6The Role of Time Value of Money and Uncertainty in Decision Making
Present Value is a specific case of the Time value of money (TVM). TVM is a
concept employed by economists, psychologists and policy makers when assessing
the value of commodities (e.g. money, time commitments, favors, etc) over time. The
base idea is relatively simple; people tend to value items/payments made in the
present more highly than in the future (Fishburn & Rubinsteing, 1982; Frederikc,
Loewenstein, & O'Donoghue, 2002). In order to accede to a delayed payment,
individuals demand a premium (usually in the form of interest) in addition to the
base amount proposed. For example, an individual may be willing to accept $110 in
six months in lieu of$100 today, but not $105 in six months.
Economists and policy makers typically use interest rates in the market as the
default individual discount rate. Individual discount rates, however, have been
shown to be far more volatile and specific. The individual discount rate wil
determine at which point the individual is indifferent to a payment now or in the
future. Research has shown that an accurate estimate of an individuals implicit
discount rate is difficult to elicit, even in controlled laboratory settings (Coller &
Williams, 1999).
The following are important characteristics of individual discount rates that
complicate the discussion of CDA acceptance:
1) Discount rates vary from person to person and over lifetime Children in
particular have notoriously high discount rates, approaching infinite
-------------------
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among very young children, as demonstrated by an inability to self-
regulate (Fishburn & Rubinsteing, 1982).
2) Individual discount rates vary from circumstance to circumstance (Chapman
& Elstein, 1995; Ciarns, 2006). For example, individual discount rates for
money have been shown to be different from discount rates for medical
care (Chapman & Elstein, 1995).
3) Discount rates will change with context and introduction of new information
(Coller & Williams, 1999).
4) Individuals are not indifferent to uncertainty and have different preferences
for resolution of uncertainty (Ahlbrecht & Weber, 1996).
Individual preferences around TVM and uncertainty will influence the
decisions that claimants make with regard to CDA acceptance. The data at hand do
not permit us to measure or infer individual claimant preferences.
A Modified Formula for the Present Value of PPD Payments
Due to the above-mentioned, variable characteristics of individual discount
rates, I propose the following modification to the standard formula for present value
of a stream of payments:
PV = [PMT/i] * [1- 1/[1+i1n]
The important difference in this version of the present value formula is i'.
i'= i + a+ j3+X+v
8Where:
i = The interest rate that would ordinarily be determined in the market for
product similar to a CDA.
a =An adjustment for age (presumed to be negative for the very young and
the elderly).
fJ =An adjustment for circumstance which would include the type of claim
and the treatment the claimant received from the employer and
insurer. For example claimants who feels poorly treated might bargain
more aggressively or a claimant with a higher tolerance for discomfort
might not bargain as aggressively as a claimant with lower tolerance.
X = An adjustment for information for example, a claimant with a good
understanding of the potential benefits he/she is entitled to may
bargain more or less aggressively than a poorly informed claimant.
Claimants may also be influenced by information not directly related to
their claim, for example, a report in the press about the corporate
practices of the insurer in areas unrelated to the issue at hand might
influence claimant behavior.
v = An adjustment for individual tolerance for uncertainty. An individual with
high tolerance for uncertainty would likely have a positive modifier to
interest for this term, whereas, an individual with low tolerance for
uncertainty would have a negative modifier.
9In summary, the implicit discount rate for CDA negotiation will vary from
person to person depending on age, circumstance, information and tolerance for
uncertainty. There are other factors that will influence individual decision-making
processes with regard to CDAs but cannot be included in a model for the individual
discount rate.
Fairness versus Personal Benefit
Individuals are also very sensitive to perceived fairness. They will incur
unnecessary cost in order to pursue revenge or forgo benefits that they feel are
significantly unequal (Rabin, 1998). If a worker feels that his/her claim is not being
treated equally as compared to similar cases, he or she will be more likely to engage
legal counsel and pursue compensation in the courts, even if the risk of receiving less
in the end is high. In these cases, we would expect to see lower acceptance of CDAs.
Stream of Income versus Lump Sum Payments
Presumably, insurers offer CDAs because they believe that they can lower
costs by eliminating full adjudication and ongoing benefit administration. CDAs may
be attractive to insurers in cases where the injury is clear-cut and a final
determination of PPD seems certain. CDA may also be attractive in cases where the
insurer believes that the claim is disingenuous (nuisance claim) but will cost more to
adjudicate than a small lump sum payment will cost.
Literature on wage and lump sum compensation shows that workers treat a
steady wage stream (such as PPD benefits) differently from a lump sum payment
(such as a CDA settlement). Workers adapt their standard of living to a change in
10
their steady pay stream rapidly and make decisions from the level they consider to
be the current status quo (Kahneman &Thaler, 1991; Rabin, 1998). Given the
amount of time it takes to settle we claims even with a eDA, it is reasonable to
assume that workers will have adapted to their new, lower earnings level and will
view the eDA as a windfall payment. Research has shown that individuals yield
greater utility from windfall payments than from an equal increase to regular wages
(Kahneman &Thaler, 1991). They are also more likely to simultaneously splurge on
extravagances and save money from a windfall payment, without increasing their
overall standard of living. PPD payments, on the other hand, tend to be distributed in
a stream, resembling steady salary disbursements. As such, claimants may not
rationally link eDA payment size (a lump sum) to PPD benefit rates (a steady
stream).
A lump sum payment, which has been shown empirically to provide more
pleasure to recipients, may be more attractive than a steady income stream, to which
recipients readily adapt. Because consumers view lump sum payments differently
from a stream of income, they may view eDA payments as inherently better and may
not equally value an increase in PPD to the eDA amount. eDAs also offer the
advantage of ending a bureaucratic process that many individuals find distasteful.
Sensitivity to Payment Amount
Individuals are not particularly adept at determining the value of very high or
low numbers. eDA payments can be quite large, in excess of several years worth of
salary. As the numbers increase, individuals are less sensitive to important
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differences than they are at lower levels (Rabin, 1998). In this case, it is likely that
claimants will more readily accept large lump sum payments than lower streams of
payment, even if the payment is not commensurate with increases in potential PPD
benefits (Camerer & Kunreuther, 1989). In cases where a large CDA offer is made,
we would expect CDA amounts to be unresponsive to increases in PPD benefits.
Rational Versus Irrational Decision Making
I have outlined a number of factors that may influence an individuals
assessment of the PV of his/her PPD claim. This project will seek to determine if
individuals are making rational connections between the PPD payments to which
they may be entitled and the CDAs they negotiate. It is important to consider how
rational is defined in this context. Some of the factors discussed above have a clear
basis in logical behavior, that is, they account for the characteristics and needs of the
claimant in manner that is consistent with individual satisfaction. Some factors seem
to influence PV decisions in ways that are not consistent with individual satisfaction.
Other factors have the potential to influence decisions in manner both consistent and
inconsistent with individual satisfaction.
For this discussion, I consider factors that work in a manner consistent with
satisfaction to be rational and factors that work against individual satisfaction to be
irrational. For example age, relevant information and tolerance for uncertainty are
considered to be rational factors. Claimant response to fairness, sensitivity to very
large and small payment amounts, response to irrelevant information and bias
toward lump sum payments are considered to be irrational factors.
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Ifthe net effect of irrational factors outweighs the net effect of rational factors
the expected relationship between PPD payments and CDA amounts may not be
evident in quantitative analysis. If individuals are, on balance, irrational in their
approach to CDA negotiation, no relationship will be observed.
Attorney Preferences
Claimants and insurers are not the only parties influencing CDA acceptance.
The typical claimant who negotiates a CDA is represented by legal counsel.
Attorneys who work with WC claimants are paid on contingency, that is, they receive
a percentage ofthe final settlement amount (Manley, 2010). This provides a
powerful motive for attorneys to select clients with a high likelihood of settlement.
Attorneys must carefully manage their portfolio of cases to balance high investment
clients (cases that will require more hours and court appearances) with low
investment clients. Attorneys have an incentive to advise clients to accept CDAs
quickly with a minimal investment of attorney time. An experienced attorney can
easily calculate how many more hours of labor will be required to elicit a particular
CDA amount and if those hours exceed the marginal benefit to the attorney (a
percentage of the increased payment). Lawyers are governed by a code of ethics and
legal requirements that they serve their clients best interest and pursue the matter at
hand as far as the client directs. However, there is a severe power imbalance in the
client attorney relationship due to information asymmetries. Clients are likely to
follow the lead of their legal counsel (Ellmann, 1987). Furthermore, studies of real
estate agents (bound by similar ethical and legal requirements) have shown that
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agents will invest more time and effort in selling their own homes, where they reap
the full benefit of an increased sale price than they will when selling a clients home
where they realize only a small percentage of the increased sale price (Levitt &
Syverson, 2008).
Attorney preference is another factor influencing CDA acceptance that cannot
be controlled for with the information available.
Predictions
Given the above discussed factors, I estimate that in cases where the claimant
feels substantially wronged (Rabin, 1998), no CDA will be negotiated so the increase
in PPD rates will have no effect. In cases where the claimant is making a "nuisance
claim" the claimant is likely to take what is offered. This amount will not likely be
sensitive to PPD rate increases, as the amount the insurer is willing to pay is based
on administrative costs rather than potential PPD payments. In cases of genuine PPD
where the claimant feels fairly treated, but for whatever reason, is averse to pursuing
full adjudication, I expect increases in PPD rates to have a moderate effect on CDA
amounts due to the environment in which CDAs are negotiated. That is, the Oregon
State system with its clearly defined benefit formulas and careful regulation of
insurers along with attorney behavior will result in consistent and predictable CDA
amounts based on expected PPD benefits. I expect these effects to be tempered by
the above-discussed decision-making characteristics of individuals and attorney self
interest. So while I expect the data to show a relationship between PPD and CDA, I
14
hypothesize that the underlying relationship will not be one that maximizes claimant
settlement amounts.
The Quasi Experiment
Using a quasi-experimental approach, I examine the relationship between
CDAs and the alternative, regular permanent partial disability payments from the
insurer. I use two methods to examine this relationship. The first method utilizes an
analysis of aggregate time series data of CDA settlements and PPD payments over a
sixteen year period from 1990-1995. This analysis will verify or reject the
assumption based in the literature that PPD is a driving factor behind CDA
settlements and determine the degree ofthis relationship in Oregon.
The second method examines individual claims before and after a legislative
increase to PPD payments. This analysis will examine individual claims with and
without PPD payments to determine if the relationship (if any) between PPD benefit
levels and CDA amounts is consistent across these two groups.
15
CHAPTER II
METHODOLOGY
This study analyzes the relationship between CDA amounts and the
alternative, regular permanent partial disability payments from the insurer. Two
methods are employed: aggregate claims analysis and individual claims analysis.
Method 1 - Aggregate Analysis
I will use time series analysis of sixty-four quarters (16 years) worth of
aggregate claims data to analyze CDA settlements as a function of PPD payments and
controls that account for claim volume, insurer type, and legislative period and
correcting for time trends and serial autocorrelation as necessary. The purpose of
this analysis is to determine if, as asserted in the literature, PPD claims are driving
CDA settlements.
The Data
The data for this analysis was drawn from the Worker Compensation
Database provided by the Oregon Department of Consumer and Business Services
(DCBS). Observations were recorded by fiscal quarter for a period of 16 years (64
quarters) between 1990-2006. The data is further segregated by WC insurer type
(see below), yielding 256 total observations.
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Model Specification and Variables
I use time series analysis of panel data to determine if there is a relationship
between aggregate CDA amounts and aggregate PPD payments by fiscal quarter.
These amounts are the final totals paid for all claims initiated in within the selected
quarter. Payments may have been made over a period of several months or even
years. That is, CDA and PPD totals for the first quarter of 1990 include all payments
made on claims that were opened within that quarter, not the total amounts paid out
during that quarter.
The model used for this analysis is:
EQUATION 1. Log(total CDA) =a + bl *Iog(total PPD) + b2*ADC Count + b3*PPD
Count+ b4*CDA Count + b5*time + b6*insurer+ B7*legislative
period
The variables examined are the total CDA amounts paid, the amount of total
PPD paid for claims from the subject quarter, the total number of disability claims
made in the subject quarter (ADC Count), the total number of PPD claims (PPD
Count), the total number of CDAs negotiated (CDA Count), a variable to describe time
change, dummy variables for insurer (4 categories), and dummy variables for
legislative period (7 categories) changes in PPD payment levels.
Logarithmic Transformation
In cases where data are not normally distributed or are non-linear in nature,
it is standard procedure to transform the variables. Dollar figures are some of the
17
values typically transformed. For this analysis I transform the data for total eDA and
total PPD using the log of the total dollar amount.
Insurer
Employers in Oregon have the choice of purchasing workers compensation
insurance from the state chartered non-profit SAIF, from private insurance
companies or of self-insuring. SAIF is the largest single insurer issuing 50% of we
polices in Oregon and covering over 500,000 of the 1.5 million employees in Oregon
(Oregon, 2010; SAIF, 2010). A very small minority of employers have not purchased
insurance and are considered non-complying. For the purpose ofthis analysis,
quarterly observations have been divided into four insurer categories: SAIF, Private,
Self and Noncomplying. Dummy variables for each insurer type are included in the
analysis with SAIF as the reference point.
Legislative Periods
The Oregon legislature periodically reviews and revises permanent partial
disability statues. Typical revisions include administrative changes, adjustments to
the state average weekly wage, and increases in PPD award amounts by body part
type. Based upon changes to state average weekly wage (SAWW) (which influence
some PPD award calculations) and percentage increases to body part types, I have
identified seven distinct legislative periods, which might influence PPD award
amounts. These periods are represented by dummy variables. Each period is
exclusive. A table oflegislative periods can be found in Appendix A.
------------
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Autocorrelation in Time-Series Data Analysis
Time series data is often subject to problems of autocorrelation. The presence
of serial autocorrelation will be checked using the Durbin-Watson test. If the Durbin-
Watson statistic value is above the critical range serial autocorrelation will not be
indicated. If the value is below he critical range it will be necessary to correct of
autocorrelation.
Expected Results
I expect that total PPD amounts will be predictive of total CDA amounts. I
expect the coefficient of PPD to be positive and significant. According to the current
literature and DCBS, PPD claims are a major driver of CDA settlements. If no
relationship is evident it will be necessary to revisit the fundamental assumptions of
this study.
Method 2 - Individual Analysis
An opportunity for individual claim comparison arose in 1996 when the
Oregon legislature raised the benefit cap on PPD and other benefit payments under
Senate Bill 369 (hereafter referred to as SB369). The increase for PPD benefits went
into effect January 1, 1996. Implementation of changes in other WC benefits went
into effect six months earlier on July 1, 1995.
CDAs are a substitute for other forms of benefits, primarily PPD. The time lag
between benefit increases offers us the opportunity to isolate and measure the effect
of PPD rates on CDA amounts. We will compare CDA settlement amounts for claims
six months before and six months after the PPD benefit increase.
_._-----------------------
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Analysis will involve bivariate and multivariate analysis of individual claims
data in order to determine any relationship between PPD benefit levels and CDA
settlement amounts. In order to isolate the effects of PPD on CDA amounts, I will
control for demographic factors (age, gender and education) and pre-injury wage.
The Data
The data for this analysis was drawn from the Worker Compensation
Database provided by the Oregon Department of Consumer and Business Services
(DCBS). The data set included 2062 claims, 1113 made prior to the benefit increase
and 949 after the increase. These periods were as follows:
Pre-benefit change: injury dates 7/1/95 through 12/31/95; CDAs approved
from 1/1/96 through 12/31/99
Post-benefit change: injury dates 1/1/96 through 6/30/96; CDAs approved
from 7/1/96 through 6/30/00
The six-month lag from the implementation of changes in other benefits and
the implementation of changes in PPD benefits was intended to reduce the impact of
claim processing changes created by the benefit increases. This six-month window
provides the opportunity to examine PPD claims without concern that CDA
settlements are effected by other benefit changes. Approximately 1% of eligible
claims were excluded from the data set due to administrative delays. Also excluded
from the data were claims with permanent total disability and claims with fatalities
due to their infrequency and high associated costs. Also dropped from the analysis
were two claims in which negative payouts for PPD were recorded.
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The four-year window following the injury dates should encompass between
80 and 90 percent of the CDAs ultimately expected to arise from that period, based
on lag times from injury to resolution for FY 1999 CDAs.
Insurers are not required to report periodic payments made to claimants who
negotiate a CDA prior to claim closure. Closure of a claim happens when a
determination is made as to whether the injury resulted in PPD or not. In cases of
CDA settlement without closure, the data do not include information about PPD 0
timeloss payments.
Model Specification and Variables
I begin by using bivariate analysis to examine CDA sensitivity to PPD benefit
increase in individual claims. This analysis describes the means of the variables CDA
amount, PPD paid, time loss days, age, pre-injury wage, gender, and education level
before and after the PPD rate increase. Henceforth I will refer to this final variable as
the post-benefit indicator.
Two scenarios for bivariate analysis are employed. These scenarios are 1)
claims for which claimants received PPD payments prior to the negotiation of the
CDA and 2) claims which were closed prior to the negotiation of a CDA and therefore
did not have any reported timeloss or PPD payments. CDAs can be negotiated for a
number of reasons, not only as a substitute for PPD payments. CDAs may be
negotiated in lieu of reopening a claim in which a previously settled injury has
worsened, to close what insurers deem to be nuisance claims and for various other
undisclosed reasons. It is important to separate claims for which PPD has been
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determined from those that have not in order to isolate the effect of changes in PPD
benefits on the relevant CDA amounts. Presumably, PPD rates would not affect CDA
amounts for nuisance and other non-PPD related claims.
Scenario 1 is the subset we wished to examine in order to determine if PPD
benefit levels affect CDA amounts. The claims identified in scenario 1 are the ones
about which the most is known. These are the result of PPD related injuries. As such,
it is anticipated that these claims will most closely follow our model predictions. The
claims in scenario 2 certainly include claims that would have been determined to
merit PPD payments, had a CDA not been negotiated prior to claim closure.
However, the data in this scenario also includes claims that would not have yielded
PPD determinations. Given the limitations of the data set, it is not possible to
separate the PPD claims from non-PPD claims in scenario 2. Less is known about the
claims in scenario 2, however, these claims are of interest because they may more
closely fit the intended use of CDAs. That is, the CDA is negotiated prior to claim
closure, thereby reducing litigation and payment administration costs. Claims that
were closed without PPD prior to CDA settlement (343) were excluded from the
analysis.
I then conduct multivariate regression analyses of these data for a clearer
understanding of the underlying relationships. Multivariate analysis of the primary
variables (PPD Paid and CDA Amount) controlling for demographic, injury and wage
effects will provide a better understanding of changes in claims before and after
SB369. Finally, I will examine CDA amounts controlling for PPD payments,
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demographic factors and wage effects before and after the benefit change. This will
show if there is relationship between PPD and CDA and if that relationship changes
post SB369.
Three multivariate regression models are used to examine claims in the two
scenarios. The first model examines the relationship between PPD payments before
and after the benefit change.
EQUATION 2. log(PPD Paid) =constant + bl*post-SB369 + b2*time loss days +
b3* age + b4*log(weekly wage) + b5*gender + b6*education level.
The dependent variable is the log of the amount PPD Paid. The independent
variable is the post benefit indicator. This relationship can only be examined in the
1160 cases with a determination of PPD prior to CDA settlement. A positive
significant coefficient for the independent variable (post-SB369) will mean that PPD
payment amounts were higher in the post benefit period. I expect PPD benefits to be
higher in the post benefit period due to the legislated increase in benefits.
The next analysis examines CDA amounts before and after the benefit change
and is divided into two categories: claims with PPD (N=1160) and unclosed claims
without PPD (N=902).
EQUATION 3A. log(CDA Amount) =constant + bl*post-SB369 + b2*time loss days +
b3* age + b4*log(weekly wage) + b5*gender + b6*education level.
EQUATION 3B. log(CDA Amount) = constant + bl*post-SB369 + b2* age +
b3*log(weekly wage) + 4*gender + b5*education level.
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The dependent variable for these two models is the log of the CDA Amount.
The independent variable is the post benefit indicator. A significant, positive
coefficient for the post benefit indicator will mean that CDA amounts were higher in
the post benefit period. Asignificant, negative coefficient for the post benefit
indicator will indicate that CDA amounts were lower in the post benefit period.
The analysis of the model defined in Equation 3b is crucial for our
understanding of CDA settlements. The ideal CDA settlement for a PPD related claim
would occur before any payment of benefits, thereby minimizing insurer cost and
claimant time. These claims are of particular interest to DCBS.
If no significant relationship is found on the independent variable (post
SB369) in this analysis, then there is no difference between CDA amounts in the pre
and post periods. I expect to find a positive, significant relationship for claims in
scenario 1, meaning that CDAs are higher in the post benefit period. I also expect to
find a positive significant relationship for claims in scenario 2, but I expect the
coefficient to be smaller than the claims in scenario 1. Claims in scenario 2 are mixed
PPD and non PPD claims, also, less is known about these claims.
The final model combines the first two models to test the sensitivity of the
CDA amount to PPD benefit increases by analyzing claims in which PPD was awarded
prior to CDA settlement (N=1160). The model used for these claims is:
EQUATION 4. log(CDA Amount) = constant + bl*post-SB369 + b2*log(PPD Paid)+
b3*interaction term + b4* age + b5*log(weekly wage) + b6*gender
+ B7*education level
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The dependent variable is the amount of CDA awarded. The independent
variable is the post benefit indicator
The control variables used in these regression analyses are PPD Paid (total
amount of PPD payments made by the insurer), an interaction variable to test any
relationship between the post benefit indicator and the PPD payment, claimant age
at the time of injury, weekly wage of the individual at time of injury, gender, and
education level of the claimant at the time of injury. Time-loss days (number of work
days lost while the claimant was supported on temporary disability) was omitted
from this final analysis due to over specification. The inclusion of PPD Paid in the
model accounts for injury severity over the long term. Inclusion of the short term
injury severity variable (timeloss days) is no longer necessary and would result in
over-specification if used.
This final model is the key model for fully understanding the relationship
between PPD payments and CDA amounts. The claims analyzed here provide the
most information about this relationship and will allow for more reliable
conclusions. I expect to observe a positive, significant coefficient for PPD Paid and no
significant relationship of the post benefit indicator. I do expect CDA amounts to be
higher in the post period, however, controlling for PPD payments should eliminate
this relationship. A significant coefficient for the post benefit indicator would mean
that another, unaccounted for factor is influencing CDA amounts differently between
the pre and post periods.
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Interaction term
Because the amount of the average PPD reported in the second period is
expected to increase due to the legislative change, there is a chance of interaction
between the post benefit indicator and the PPD amounts reported. To check for this
an interaction variable is introduced into the model. If the interaction term proves
significant, it will mean that the relationship between PPD and CDA changes from the
pre period to the post period. This would mean that claimant behavior was not
consistent across legislative periods and would indicate that claimants are not
making rational connections between PPD payments and CDA amounts. If the
interaction term is not significant then there is no danger of interaction between PPD
and the post benefit indicator and the interaction term will be discarded from the
analysis.
Expected Results
In summary, in bivariate analysis I expect to see that CDA amounts and PPD
amounts will be significantly, positively different in the post benefit period.
Multivariate analysis of PPD claims is expected to yield a positive significant
coefficient, as are analyses of CDAs for scenario 1 and 2 (though I expect 2 to have a
lower magnitude of effect). In the final model (combing analysis of PPD and CDA) I
expect to see no significant relationship on the post benefit indicator and a positive
significant relationship between PPD and CDA amounts.
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CHAPTER III
RESULTS
Method 1 - Aggregate Data
Visual inspection of the data shows that trends are consistent within insurer
type, though different across insurers. Figures 1 and 2 shows time series charts over
the 64 fiscal quarter period from 1990-2005 separated by insurer. Claims from
workers employed by Non-complying firms are omitted due to low numbers.
Figure 1. Time Series Chart ofNumber ofCDAs Settled and Total CDA
Payouts 1990-1996 (by quarter)
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As shown in Figure 1, as the total number of COA settlements negotiated goes
down (as they do in the case of Private and Self insuring organizations) so to do the
total payment amounts for these categories. Likewise, as the number of settlements
goes up (as in the case of SAIF claims) so do payments.
Figure 2. Time Series Chart ofNumber ofPPD Claims Filed and Total
PPD Payouts 1990-1996 (by quarter)
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A similar inspection of PPO Claims and Payments shows that claims and
payments go down for Private and Self insuring organizations and up for
organizations insured by SAIF.
Analysis of aggregate data (Equation 1) seeks to illuminate whether COA
amounts and PPO amounts move together over time, No causality can be inferred
from the analysis presented here, however, a result indicating that COA and PPO are
linked, would support the assumption that PPO claims are driving COAs. As table 1
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shows, this is the case. PPD is found to be a significant, positive predictor of CDA
awards in the aggregate analysis.
Table 1. Time Series Analysis ofCDA Amounts by
Fiscal Quarter
Log(CDA Amount)
Settlements
N=256
Log(Total PPD Paid) 0.304***
Total Disability Claims Accepted 0.000
Total PPD Claims Accepted -0.001*
Total CDAs negotiated 0.003***
Time Trend Variable -0.003
SAIF -
Private 0.012
Self -0.196**
Non-complying -1.239***
Legislative Period 1 -
Legislative Period 2 -0.024
Legislative Period 3 -0.056
Legislative Period 4 -0.063
Legislative Period 5 0.031
Legislative Period 6 0.139
Legislative Period 7 0.119
Adiusted R-squared 0.929
Durbin Watson Statistic 1.940t
*p<.OS ** p<.Ol ***p<.OOl
tOurbing-Watson Critical Range 1.667-1.920
The number of accepted disability claims is not a predictor of CDA amounts,
however, the number of PPD claims and the number of CDAs negotiated are
significant predictors of CDA amounts. The only other significant relationships found
are on the dummy variables for Self insured employers and Non-complying insurers.
This indicates a significant difference between claims originating in companies that
are self insured versus claims originating from SAIF insured organizations. This is
not particularly surprising giving the nature or organizations that might seek to self
insure, that is organizations with the administrative and financial capacity to set
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aside reserves to cover WC claims, to administer claims and the inclination to do so.
Likewise, the very small number and nature of non-complying firms is expected to
differ from the norm. It is noteworthy that the differences between SAIF and the Self
insured and non-complying employers are negative implying that these insurers are
either more effective at weeding out false claims, or less generous to claimants.
Legislative period was not found to be predictive of CDA amounts.
The Durbin-Watson test yielded a value outside of the critical range, and
therefore, autocorrelation is not indicated.
Method 2 - Individual Data
Bivariate Analysis
Bivariate analysis showed that, on average, workers determined to have PPD
claims who accepted a CDA pre-SB369 (scenario 1) were male, 39 years in age at the
time of injury and had just eleven years of formal education (see table 2). This makes
intuitive sense, as jobs most likely to result in serious injuries are manual labor
positions that do not require formal education. The average weekly wage of these
claimants atthe time of injury was $445. This range is lower (about 15%) than the
State Average Weekly Wage (SAWW) of$515 for Oregon in 1996 (Helmer, 1997).
Claimants in this category lost and average of 196 days oflabor due to injury.
The same group in the post SB369 period was, on average, male, 40 years in
age and had eleven years of formal education. The average weekly wage of these
claimants was $451, also about 15% less than SAWW. Claimants in this group lost an
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average of 191 days oflabor due to injury. The differences between claimants are for
most measures small, and only significant in the case of age.
There is a significant difference in PPD payments of $1,591 between the pre
and post claims. This is expected, given the benefit increase. There is no increase in
CDA Amounts from the pre to post period. If claimants are connecting PPD benefits
to CDAs we should observe a significant increase in CDA Amounts in the post period.
Table 2. Bivariate Analysis for all Individual Claims before and after
5B-369
Claims Resulting in CDA
N=2062
Claims without PPD
Claims with PPD Determined Prior to
Determined Closure
N=1160 N=902
Pre Post Pre Post
N=642 N=518 N=471 N=431
CDAAmount 12,185 12,876 12,304 14,640
Total PPD Paid 9,485 11,076** - -
Time-loss Days 196 191 - -
Age 39 40* 38 39
Pre-injury Wage 445 451 322 334
Male 70 70 66 65
Female 30 31 34 35
Years formal
Education 11 11 10 10
No Diploma 33% 36% 41% 40%
High School
Diploma 67% 64% 59% 60%
Some College 26% 29% 28% 29%
*p<.OS ** p<.Ol ***p<.OOl
Bivariate analysis showed that on average workers who accepted CDAs prior
to claim closure (scenario 2) during the pre-SB369 period were male, 38 years in age
at the time of injury and had just ten years of formal education. The average weekly
wage of these claimants at the time of injury was $322. This range is substantially
lower (about 33%) than SAWW. The same group in the post SB369 period was, on
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average, male, 39 years in age and had ten years of formal education. The average
weekly wage of these claimants was $334, also about 33% less than SAWW. The
differences between claimants in the pre and post periods are small.
As with the scenario 1 claims no significant change in CDA amounts is
observed is observed in scenario 2. This shows consistency between the two groups,
though the result is not as expected. Controlling for demographic characteristics and
severity of injury between claims in the pre and post periods may yield the expected
results.
Regression Analysis
Table 3 shows the results of the regression to examine the effects of the
benefit change on PPD amounts (Equation 2). Unsurprisingly, after controlling for
severity of injury (timeloss days), age, wage, gender and education, there was a
significant, positive change in benefits between the two periods. Time-loss days and
age at time of injury were also significant, positive factors. Data for this regression
could only be analyzed roughly half the total cases, as no PPD benefits were reported
for claimants who negotiated CDAs prior claim closure.
Table 3. Analysis ofPPD Payments before
and after 5B-369
Log(Total PPD Paid)
N=1160
Post Benefit Indicator 0.067**
Time-loss Days 0.001 ***
Age 0.004***
Log(Pre-injury Wage) 0.004
Male 0.035
Years formal Education -0.002
Adjusted R-squared 0.176
*p<.OS ** p<.Ol ***p<.OOl
Table 4 shows the results of the regression to examine the effects of the
benefit change on CDA amounts. Two different regressions are examined in this
table. The first regression examines claims with a determination of PPD prior to
settlement (Equation 3a). The second examines claims with out PPD and without
closure prior to settlement (Equation 3b).
Table 4. Analysis oJeDA Settlements
Log(CDA Log(CDA I
Amount) Amount)
in Claims with In Claims without I
PPD PPD
N=1160 N=902
Post Benefit Indicator -0.029 0.043
Time-loss Days 0.001*** -
Age 0.005*** 0.003
Pre-injury Wage 0.105** 0.283*** I
Male 0.111*** 0.175***
Years formal
Education 0.002 0.002
Adjusted R-squared 0.142 0.244
*p<.05 ** p<.Ol ***p<.OOl
Consistent with the bivariate analysis, there is no significant change in CDA
amounts on the post-benefit indicator for claims in scenario 1 or scenario 2. This
result is the only multivariate analysis for claims in scenario 2.
Taken together the two analyses examining the effects of the benefit change
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on PPD and CDA , would seem suggest that claimants do not rationally connect PPD
benefit increases to CDA amounts. PPD benefits increase in a significant, positive
fashion but CDA amounts do not. However, in order to develop a more accurate
picture of claimant behavior, it is necessary to combine these two models.
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The third analysis tests the relationship between CDA amounts and the
benefit change, controlling for PPD payments made. This analysis (Equation 4) uses
only the 1160 claims in which PPD is reported (table 5).
Table 5. Regression Analysis for
Individual Claims
Log(CDA
Amount) in
Claims with PPD
payments
N=1160
Post Benefit Indicator -0.061*
Total PPD Paid 0.514***
Age 0.003*
Pre-injury Wage 0.107**
Male 0.097**
Years formal
Education 0.003
Adiusted R-sQuared 0.207
*p<.OS ** p<.Ol ***p<.OOl
Here a significant change in CDA amounts is observed in the period after the
increase in PPD benefit rates, however the coefficient is negative, indicating that CDA
settlements were lower in the post period. The amount of PPD benefits paid, the
time-loss days, age, weekly wage prior to injury and gender, are all positive,
significant predictors of CDA settlement amounts.
The interaction term was not significant, thus there is no concern that the
post benefit indicator and PPD paid are interrelated. The magnitude and direction of
the change in the post benefit indicator are small and negative, meaning that CDAs
are not sensitive to increases in PPD funding levels. However, because the interaction
term is not significant and PPD is a significant positive predictor of CDA amounts, we
must conclude that the relationship, between PPD and CDAs does not change between
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the pre and post periods. That is, CDA settlements in the post benefit period do reflect
increases that match the PPD benefit change.
The negative coefficient for the post benefit indicator must mean that some
other, unaccounted for, factor must be pushing down CDA amounts in the post
benefit period.
In summary, bivariate analysis showed no significant change in CDA amounts
between the pre and post periods, counter to expectations. PPD amounts did
increase between pre and post periods as expected. Multivariate analysis of PPD
payments showed a significant, positive change, as expected. Multivariate analysis of
CDA amounts did not show a significant change between pre and post periods. This
result is also counter to expectations. This means, that for scenario 2 claims, we
cannot conclude that CDAs are sensitive to PPD amounts. The final multivariate
analysis, combining post benefit indicator and PPD to predict CDA amounts yielded
significant coefficients for both variables. The coefficient for the post benefit
indicator was negative, indicating an unknown, downward effect on CDA amounts.
The coefficient for PPD was positive. This is consistent with the other analyses and
as predicted.
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CHAPTER IV
DISCUSSION
Research into workers' compensation tends to focus on the broad economic
impacts to employers and society. Inquiries into the effects of benefit increases focus
on the tendency of employees to malinger and employers to improve safety
measures. Little or no attention has been paid to how workers make decisions
regarding compensation for on-the-job injuries. Psycho-economic models would
suggest that workers' treat lump-sum payments far differently from stream of
income payments.
The available data do permit exploration ofthe underlying relationship between
PPD and CDA. That is, will a person negotiating a CDA correctly account for their PPD
entitlement to yield a fair settlement? Without definitive information that a claim
resulting in CDA 1) is in fact PPD related, 2) can be classified as an original or
reopened claim, 3) can be assigned an amount of PPD the claimant is entitled to, we
cannot examine this relationship. Further complicating the analysis, no reliable
measures for individual discount rates, attorney preferences or the nature of the
injury are available.
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Instead, I examine time series data that track PPD and CDA amounts and the
effects of a benefit change on individual CDA amounts.
Aggregate analysis does show a relationship between PPD payments and CDA
amounts, confirming the assumption that the two are related in a positive and
significant fashion.
Results from the individual analysis do show a relationship between PPD
payments and CDA amounts, but only cases with confirmed PPD payments (scenario
1). For those claims without PPD payments (scenario 2), no change in CDA amounts
is observed in the post benefit period. Ifthere is a relationship between potential
PPD payments and CDA settlement amounts, we would expect to see a significant
positive change in this variable.
Why is there an inconsistency between these two groups? First, there is
uncertainty between the two groups; that is, I am not able to measure the same
things. It is possible, that if an estimated PPD amount were introduced into the
model for scenario 2 claims I might observe the same relationship as in the scenario
1 claims.
Scrutiny is another possible issue. Scenario 1 claims are under closer scrutiny
by DCBS. Because these claims were determined to be PPD related and PPD
payments were made, insurers are required to report more information to DCBS. It
is likely that the claimants in these cases have a reasonable understanding of the
nature of the their injury and the benefits to which they are entitled. Claimants in
scenario 2 settled before any determination of PPD. Insurers are not required to
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report time-loss information for scenario 2 claims. It is likely that claimants in
scenario 2 have less information. DCBS knows very little about these claims, making
it difficult for government agents to determine if insurers are treating claimants
fairly.
While it is true that Oregon laws prevent insurers from utilizing the more
predatory practices witnessed elsewhere, it is still possible that insurers in Oregon
are using CDAs to undercompensated workers. It is notable that the average wage of
workers in scenario 2 was over 30% lower than that of workers in scenario 1.
Perhaps insurers are targeting more vulnerable workers after all.
It is possible that for the workers in scenario 1, where more information
about the claim is known, the system of state regulation along with attorney
expertise creates a system in which CDA settlements are influenced by PPD amounts.
It is also possible that for workers in scenario 2, reduced protections are resulting in
poorly negotiated settlements.
Limitations
The data presented in the individual analysis are from a very limited time
frame (six months before and after the benefit increase) and as such may mask long-
term cyclical trends in CDA amounts. Furthermore, neither the pre nor the post
period covers an entire year. In a rural state like Oregon with significant seasonal
industry (logging, construction, conservation, agriculture, etc), it is possible that the
nature of injuries change throughout the year.
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The data set analyzed was limited. Data on time loss days payments made by
insurers for PPD and PPD status were not available for claimants who negotiated a
CDA before claim closure or determination of PPD status. It is likely that certain
types of claims - claims where the nature of the injury was clear and easy to assess
or claims where the injury was negligible - were settled quickly to avoid litigation
costs.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
The relationship between PPD payments and CDA amounts is complex and
encompasses a number of variables not accounted for in currently available data.
The analysis presented here raises more questions than it answers and highlights
how little is actually known agreebout CDA.
Policy Implications
Ifworkers do not connect potential gains in disability payments to the lump
sum payments they accept through CDAs then CDA amounts will remain relatively
flat. CDAs will therefore become even more attractive to insurers seeking to reduce
costs incurred in fully mediated PPD claims. We would expect to see an increase in
the number of CDAs negotiated. Given that PPD payments are among the most
common and most expensive component of WC expenditures, an increase in CDAs
should dampen the steady increase in WC premiums employers pay. Ifthe primary
goal of policy is to reduce WC costs, CDAs may well be an attractive solution. It
remains to be seen, however, if claimants make a rational connection between PPD
benefits and CDA settlements and if they do, how accurate their estimations of the
value of PPD benefits are.
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State agencies involved in the WC processes would be well advised to
carefully monitor CDA settlements in order to protect workers from predatory
practices on the part of insurers. Analysis of CDA type settlements in states with
more litigious systems has shown that insurers and legal counsel have significant
incentives to take advantage of at-risk workers and recommend settlements far
lower than what the worker might otherwise be entitled to.
In states like Oregon, where litigation is low, predatory behavior is
discouraged and medical benefits cannot be released, CDAs may be a quick and cost
saving approach to negotiating PPD settlements. In the context of this research,
however, it appears that CDAs are not in the best interest of claimants. CDA amounts
are not consistently responsive to relevant benefit increases and aggregate level
analysis shows no relationship between PPD and CDA.
APPENDIX
LEGISLATIVE PERIODS
Table 6. Legislative Periods
Period Time Frame
Period 1 January 1990-June 1994
Period 2 July 1994-June 1995
Period 3 July 1995-December 1997
Period 4 January 1998-December 2001
Period 5 January 2002-December 2004
Period 6 January 200S-June 2005
Period 7 July 200S-December 2005
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